



NRO REVIEW COMPLETED

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Copy 6 of 8

27 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR : Assistant Director, Office of Special Activities
SUBJECT : Move of Satellite Control Center

1. Now that the decision to move the center has been made, I believe there are some subordinate decisions which are required in connection with the following topics, which have not been graded as to priority:

A. Communications: We need to determine whose communications system will be employed in dealing with the West Coast. It is fairly clear that on-orbit decisions will be made in the Pentagon and presumably transmitted to [] in some fashion or other. If our system is not to be used to communicate with [] or if the action location on the West Coast is going to move down to Los Angeles and SSD, we could presumably close out our center where [] is and recapture a few people. Without seeming to be a dog in the manger, I question whether we should be the party to support this operation from a communications standpoint now that control has gone to the Pentagon; this is a view which [] shares with me. On the other hand, I do not think we should prematurely deal ourselves out of the communications net entirely, or we will find ourselves without any information whatever on the progress of decisions in the Washington OPCEN. Suggest this might well be discussed jointly between us with Ops and Commo, as well as Security, involved.

B. Security: [] has already indicated that he feels OSA should back out of direct security support to the satellite operation as far [] and operational support is concerned. If this were to happen, he could turn his responsibility in effect over to [] security officer responsible for making determinations as to the quarter from which direct security support

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should come. In other words, rather than inflate [] staff, we would consider making satellite systems' support a responsibility of the Office of Security rather than OSA. This too needs discussion.

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C. What to Do with [] and Company:

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Knowing as little as we do about General Greer's intentions with regard to the role [] plays now that the locus of control has shifted, it is difficult to predict [] immediate future. We could continue him on our T/O, as we will I assume [] but it is fairly obvious that he will be one hundred percent subordinated to General Greer from a command point of view. I also think that if we cut [] loose, it will be bad for his morale, and perhaps there are advantages to having a "window" into SSD at the operating level. This needs discussion.

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D. Effect of Move of Control Center on EDP Programing:

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I am not certain what the move of the center will do to the plans for computer support discussed recently, i. e., moving an IBM 7090 into Langley. I gather from fragmentary conversations on the subject that without the satellite requirement we would have difficulty justifying full-time use of such a gigantic computer. The only other input I have on this is that Dr. Scoville mentioned last week making the NPIC UNIVAC 490 available to NRO. This whole subject has me completely baffled, since I thought that one of our strongest arguments for retention of the center was our intended possession of a computer capability. I wonder if we should also check with [] to see what actions need to be altered regarding the emplacement of computer repeater equipment in the Operations Center. I seem to recall that we were planning on an electronics link between the computer in the basement and the Operations Center to support CORONA/MURAL/LANYARD.

E. Personnel Recruitment for Advance Systems Research:

John Parangosky feels, as you know, that this most recent decision makes it totally infeasible to recruit talented personnel into OSA for the sole purpose of researching new satellite systems which now seems to be the province of SSD and company. I tend to the view that

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we need to surface this directly with DD/R before we go any further in terms which can be easily comprehended. I think there is nothing worse than getting technical people on board who would then find out that they had nothing to do. As far as I can tell, the Pentagon side of NRO has little intention of including CIA in any aspect of advance systems planning as evidenced by the studies which have been assigned to General Greer and the fact that there has been consistent resistance to including this kind of research money in our NRO budget. I also wonder if we ought not to take another look at the 1964 budget in the light of the move of the center to see what changes might be indicated.

2. I am sure there are other problems which will become apparent to us as this whole dismal picture moves ahead. I have a strong tendency to say "to hell with it", but I know that we cannot simply deal with this problem emotionally. I would appreciate the chance to discuss this with you in depth.

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